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Abstract
This paper discusses competing-destinations formulation of the gravity model
for the flows of patients from their residential areas to health supplier regions.
This approach explicitly acknowledges the interdependence of the patient flows
between a set of alternative health supplier regions. This competing-destinations
based approach may be implemented as a probabilistic demand function or con-
ditional logit model, with a Poisson outcome. A Texas based case study of
residential areas and State Mental Hospitals (SMHs) is presented. The results
of the estimation do not lend support to the presence of scale effects in SMHs
due to the size of population. This result, combined with the negative effect of
average length of stay in hospitals (ALOS) and with the positive effect of the
provision of forensic services on patient flows, highlights the problem of caseload
growth in SMHs.
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1 Introduction
The central focus of the present work is modeling patient flows from their residen-
tial regions to health suppliers’ regions. The basis for modeling flows is the gravity
model: gravity models applied in contexts of human behavior involve a “mass” term
for both the origin and destination, and incorporate the impact of distance on human
spatial choices. In line with gravity modeling principles, patient flows from different
residential regions (origins) to health suppliers’ regions (destinations) reflect firstly,
patterns of population demand as determined by the size of populations; second, the
size and range of facilities in different health suppliers’ regions; and third, the impact
of economic and social separation on human spatial choices determined by distances
or travel times from homes to health suppliers’ regions.
Application of the gravity modeling to the issue of patient flows and hospital
choice dates back to the late 1960s (see the early works of Morill and Earickson
(1968), Studnicki (1975), Roghman and Zastowny (1979)). More recently, papers by
Lowe and Sen (1996), Congdon (2001), Levaggi and Zanola (2004), Cantarero (2006),
Fabbri and Robone (2010) adopt this framework to investigate patient mobility. Lowe
and Sen (1996) use the gravity model to study the flows for acute inpatient hospital
care from six-county metropolitan Chicago area to 92 hospitals in that same area in the
year 1987. The model is used to forecast how potential changes in hospital financing
policy can change patient flows. Congdon (2001) models patient flows to emergency
units in 127 electoral wards in North East London and Essex and describes how such
models may be adapted to allow for unit closures and expansion, or the opening up
of other units. The estimation of the gravity model is based on simulation based
Bayesian methods. Levaggi and Zanola (2004) study the net flows of people moving
from one Italian region to another as determined by regional differences in the quality
of healthcare and distance. The dataset they use is a sample of observations over
the period 1994-1997. A similar analysis is developed by Cantarero (2006) working
on patient mobility across Spanish regions during the period 1996-1999. Fabbri and
Robone (2010) evaluate the extent to which the observed imbalances in the Italian
geography of hospital admissions are due to scale effects or reflect the presence of
other spatial factors in the distribution of healthcare resources.
We analyze patient mobility across Texas using data on hospital admissions that
occurred in state-owned hospitals during the year 2006. In the reference year, the
Texas State is partitioned into nine state-owned mental hospitals with the correspond-
ing hospital service areas (HSA). The use of mental healthcare resources in Texas is
highly localized. The Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) is respon-
sible for managing the nine state-owned mental hospitals (SMH). The SMH are one
component of the statewide mental health delivery system that includes inpatient
care and community-based care. DSHS designates Local Mental Health Authorities
(LMHA) that are responsible for achieving continuity of care in meeting a person’s
need for mental health services in the least restrictive environment. Within this con-
tinuum of care the SMH’s primary purpose is to stabilize the patients admitted by
providing inpatient mental health treatment. Admission to SMH can occur voluntar-
ily or involuntary. Involuntarily admissions include civil and forensic commitments.
There are also state provisions for the commitment of persons with intellectual dis-
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abilities experiencing acute psychiatric illness. Generally speaking, an LMHA screens
persons who are self referred or referred by a community source, such as a police offi-
cer in the resident’s service area. In collaboration with the judiciary, the LMHA has
the duty of finding the least restrictive, most appropriate treatment setting for the
patients, who may be referred to state mental hospitals. If a person seeks admission
independently of an LMHA, the SMH by law must conduct an emergency psychiatric
screening which may result in patient admission to the SMH. In consultation with the
LMHA, the admissions physician has final authority for admitting persons consistent
with the availability of hospital resources.
SMHs face managerial and fiscal challenges in meeting the needs of Texans with
severe mental illness. Three significant challenges are addressing the growing forensic
population, managing outside medical costs, and maintaining aging infrastructure.
One of the major problems associated with the growing forensic population is the
longer lengths of stay, often more than 90 days for forensic patients in SMH. These
longer lengths of stay and the overall increase in the forensic population have led to
longer wait times and waiting lists at SMHs for forensic beds.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) demonstrate that the traditional gravity equa-
tion is mis-specified and coefficient estimates are likely biased owing to omission of
nonlinear multilateral resistance terms. These multilateral resistance variables cap-
ture the dependence of trade flows between trading countries on trade costs across
all possible trading suppliers. Following Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) seminal
paper addressing omitted variables bias in the gravity equation, we include a vari-
able to explain the spatial structure of patient flows in a geographical system. In
general terms, destinations are viewed as competing with each other for interaction.
One possible measure of destination competition is the competition factor, a composite
variable that attempts to capture the gravity of the competing destinations (de Mello-
Sampayo, 2009). The competing destinations gravity model represents a step forward
in recognition of interdependencies in spatial choice (Fotheringham, 1983a,b, Thorsen
and Gitlesen, 1998). Its main difference from the classic version stems from the fact
that a competition factor encompassing the ability of third destinations to attract
interaction flows is included as a dampening factor to inputs flowing to any potential
destination.
The effect of several factors on the flow of patients from their residential area
to SMHs is tested under the competing-destination gravity model implemented as a
probabilistic demand function or conditional logit model, with a Poisson outcome.
The flow of patients to the SMH is found to be increasing in the provision of forensic
services, adjacency, institutional factors, and decreasing in average length of stay
in hospitals (ALOS), road distance, gravity posed by other SMHs, and accessibility
to other SMHs. This evidence suggests that county-specific spatial factors are very
important determinants of the patient flows. These results, combined with the fact
that the factor capturing the gravity of competing destinations, emerge with high
significance and the correct sign, corroborating the use of the competing-destination
formulation of the gravity model for the analysis of the patient flows to SMHs.
There is a long tradition in the literature of making a log-linearization of the grav-
ity models and to estimate the parameters of interest using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). However, it fails to work when no flow is observed between some pairs of
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origin and destination, thus making the dependent variable a true zero (Porell and
Adams, 1995). Several methods have been adopted to deal with log-linearization of
the zero observations. One view of zeros is that they stand for flows too small to re-
port. Interpreting zeros in this way, it is legitimate to drop the zero observations from
estimation because there is no economic significance to the zeros relative to the non-
zero observations. In the presence of heteroskedastic errors, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) point out that inconsistent estimation arises from the usual econometric gravity
practice using logarithmic transformation and estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). The expected value of the logarithm of a random variable depends both on its
mean and on the higher-order moments of the distribution. Hence, if the variance of
the error term in the gravity equation depends on the regressors, the expected value
of the logarithm of the error term will also depend on the regressors, violating the
condition of consistency of OLS. To address these two problems we follow the ap-
proach proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate our model using
a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator. Under the assumption that the conditional
variance is proportional to the conditional mean, the parameters of the model can be
estimated by solving a set of first-order conditions numerically equal to the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator. All that is needed for this estimator to be
consistent is the correct specification of the conditional mean. If the assumption that
the conditional variance is proportional to the conditional mean does not hold (which
is often the case), the estimator does not fully account for the heteroskedasticity in
the model. For this reason, the inference has to be based on an Eicker-White robust
covariance matrix estimator (Eicker, 1963; White, 1980).
The remainder of this paper is composed of four sections. In Section 2 we elaborate
the theoretical model, and map the theoretical results into an empirical strategy in
Section 3, where we also describe the data. We report and interpret the empirical
findings in Section 4, and provide concluding comments in the closing section.
2 Theoretical Framework
Consider an economy divided into residential regions, r = 1, 2, . . . , R, and health
suppliers’ regions, s = 1, 2, . . . , S. Let X =
∑
irs xirs be defined as the total number
of interactions in the economy, and we wish to model the interaction pattern in this
economy, i.e. xirs, the unknown amount of health service i consumed by residents of
region r at region s. There are H+1 sectors in the economy. One sector produces a
homogeneous good, while H sectors produce differentiated health service or goods. An
exogenous fraction µ of income is spent on differentiated products of sector H, and
the remaining fraction 1− µ on the homogeneous good, which is our numeraire. Now
consider the particular sector H that produces differentiated health goods or services,
i. We drop the index H, with the implicit understanding that all variables refer to
sector H.
Preferences across varieties of goods have the standard constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) form, with an elasticity of substitution σ. Let the utility function Ur
be defined and calibrated over the consumers of region r in terms of quantities of each
variety, i = 1, 2, . . . , I, consumed at region s.
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Ur = (
∫
s
∫
i
x
σ−1
σ
irs dids)
σ−1
σ , (1)
where xirs stands for the amount of health service or good, i, consumed by residents
of region r at region s. We assume monopolistic competition in the health sector so
that each variety of the differentiated good is produced or supplied by only one firm.
The price index in the differentiated health sector for region s is:
Ps = (
∫
s
∫
i
p1−σis dids)
1
1−σ . (2)
Let yr be the income of region r, which equals its expenditure level. Given the total
demand µyr on h in region r, the region r demand for each variety is given by:
xirs = µyrp
−σ
is P
σ−1
s . (3)
Assume that the maximum optimum utility, U∗r , emerging from the utility maximiza-
tion will exceed the observed utility Uro emerging from the observed flows xirso. Thus,
we investigate the entropy approach (Roy, 2004) to cope with this divergence. Let E
be the number of ways that the observed number Xiso =
∑
r xirso of distinct good i
ordered at each region s may be allocated to consumer regions r in groups xirso times
the number of ways the total of distinct goods orders Xir =
∑
s xirs made from region
r may be arbitrarily allocated to each of the Nr consumers there.
E =
∏
isXiso!∏
r xirs!
×
∏
ir
NXirr . (4)
The natural logarithm of Equation (4) is taken, the Stirling approximation1 applied,
and constant terms omitted. The entropy E then comes out as:
E = −
∑
irs
xirs[ln(
xirs
Nr
)− 1]. (5)
The maximization of Equation (5) is constrained by the model flows being induced
to conform with certain aggregate base period quantities. If we have the total utility
Uo based on the observed orders in all demand regions r, the following behavioral
constraint is applied: ∑
r
U∗r = Uo. (6)
Let consumers of the differentiated product travel from their home region r to con-
sumption region s to buy or consume the product, absorbing themselves the transport
cost of iceberg type. Namely, τrs units of xirs have to be bought by consumers of
region r from suppliers of region s in order to obtain one unit of the differentiated
product. Thus, τrs stands for the average cost of travel between r and s, and τo is the
average generalized cost of travel over the entire economy. Reproducing the observed
average generalized cost of travel τo in terms of the interzonal average cost, yields:
1The Stirling approximation is given by x! = x(lnx− 1).
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∑
rs
xirsτrs = Xτo. (7)
Maximize Equation (5) subject to Equation (6) with multiplier λ, and Equation (7)
with multiplier β to obtain:
xirs = Nre
λ σσ−1U
∗
r
xirs
+βτrs . (8)
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (8), and imposing that the predicted to-
tal interaction flow/volume leaving each origin should equal the observed value, i.e.∑
r xirs = Xiso, Equation (8) then becomes:
xirs =
XisoNre
α(
pis
Ps
)σ+βτrs∑
rNre
α(
pis
Ps
)σ+βτrs
, (9)
which has a form similar to a conditional logit model (probabilistic demand function)
and where α = λ σ
σ−1 , and β are parameters to be estimated. The parameters α, and β
reflect the perception of the destination´s attractiveness and distance as determinants
of interactions by the residents of region r. The balance of total flows is ensured by
Xiso/
∑
rNre
α(
pis
Ps
)σ+βτrs . The variable (pis
Ps
)σ measures the quality of a health good or
service i since the price of a specific health service relative to the price index of area
s, weighted geometrically by the elasticity of substitution, gives an index performance
of one good to another with a ratio chart. We expect α to be positive, indicating
that as area s increases in quality, the volume of interactions between r and s increase.
Conversely, we expect β to be negative: as the economic distance between region r
and region s increases, the volume of interaction between them decreases.
The standard form of the gravity model as presented in Equation (9) contains an
independence from the irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property: the ratio of flows to any
two destinations is independent of any other destination (Fotheringham, 1984). The
IIA axiom may be modified to reflect interdependencies in spatial choice. If these
interdependencies are introduced into the gravity model, the ratios of predicted flows
to remaining suppliers will be affected by the choice of a particular health supplier
region (Fotheringham, 1984). Problems with the IIA principle occur in other choice
modeling contexts, see for example Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) on trade and
de Mello-Sampayo (2009) on FDI location choices.
2.1 Competing Destinations Model
In general terms, destination areas are viewed as competing with each other for in-
teraction and when a variable measuring such competition is included in the grav-
ity framework, the resulting interaction models are known as competing destinations
model (Fotheringham, 1983a). One possible measure of destination competition is the
competition factor, a composite variable that attempts to capture the gravity of the
competing destinations (see de Mello-Sampayo, 2007, 2009):
cis =
∑
k 6=r,s
α(
pik
Pk
)σ/βτrk, (10)
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where cis is the sum, weighted by economic distance, of all other destinations’ char-
acteristics (except destination s) in attracting patient flows from r. The variable pik
Pk
σ
represents the attractiveness of destination k; τrk represents the economic distance
between origin r and destination k; α, and β are defined as in the gravity model given
by Equation (9). Often they are set to one in the competition formulation (Roy, 2004).
The competing destinations version of the gravity model in Equation (9) is given by:
xirs =
XisoNre
α(
pis
Ps
)σ+βτrs+γcis∑
rNre
α(
pis
Ps
)σ+βτrs+γcis
, (11)
where α, β, and γ are parameters to be estimated. The parameters α and β are given
as in Equation (9). A negative value of γ demonstrates the presence of competition or
congestion forces. The above model structure clearly represents a great step forward
in recognition of interdependencies in spatial choice. Its main difference from the
classic version stems from the fact that a competition factor encompassing the ability
of third destinations to attract interaction flows is included as a dampening factor to
patients flowing to any potential destination.
In the context of same type origin-destination gravity models, Fotheringham (1983a)
proposed a potential accessibility measure:
ais =
∑
k 6=r,s
α(
pik
Pk
)σ/βτsk, (12)
where ais represents the accessibility of destination s in relation to all other destina-
tions. The higher the quality in destinations k, and the closer these destinations are
to s (i.e., the smaller is τsk), the lower is the flow expected from r to s since there is a
spatial concentration of opportunities in the neighborhood of s. In this situation the
access measure ais models competition effects since it will be high but the flow low,
so that this type of accessibility has a negative impact on flows if several areas with
large masses are close to each other. Alternatively stated, it may model agglomeration
effects if the higher the quality in destinations k, and the closer these destinations are
to s, the higher is the flow expected from r to s since there is a spatial concentration
of opportunities in the neighborhood of s. In this situation the access measure ais will
be high and the flow high, so that this type of “accessibility” has a positive impact
on flows if several areas with large masses are close to each other.
Earlier studies that attempt to control for geographical patterns, Santos-Silva and
Tenreyro (2006), Fabbri and Robone (2010), Deardoff (1998), although it is an athe-
oretic measure, use the variable remoteness to account for the hypothesis that larger
distances to all other locations might increase bilateral flows between two locations.
The variable remoteness is defined as the mean distance of each destination from all
other destinations, weighted by the population of each HSA. The variable remoteness
allows us to test the hypothesis that larger distances to all other locations might in-
crease bilateral flows between two locations, other things being equal. According to
evidence in the empirical literature on trade, this variable affects flows positively (see
Deardoff (1998)). This point is clarified by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) when
they notice that the most remote locations will tend to trade more between each other
because they do not have alternative trading partners. This relative distance mea-
sure is based on the premise that the origins are also potential destinations, and is
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beyond the scope of the present study, since it applies to gravity models where origins
and destinations are both the same kind of unit. In this study the origins (areas of
residence) differ from destinations (hospitals).
In health applications where origins and destinations are not of the same type,
Congdon (2001) replaced the attractiveness of destinations and distance terms of the
standard gravity model in Equation (8) by a function in relative accessibility. This rel-
ative accessibility amounts to a distance-weighted supply measure (for a given supply
more distant hospitals are down weighted) or equivalently a supply-weighted distance
measure (of two equally distant hospitals the one with the larger supply will receive
larger patient flows). In particular, the introduction of this form of accessibility means
that the IIA property no longer holds and that the ratios of predicted flows to remain-
ing hospitals are affected by the closure of a particular unit or the opening of a new
one. However, competition effects between nearby hospitals are not represented di-
rectly in this form of relative access measure, and it may not appropriate to combine
separate access, distance and hospital mass terms in a single model.
3 Empirical Application
We analyze patient mobility across state-owned hospitals in Texas using data on hos-
pital admissions that occurred during the year 2006. Patient flows are reported in the
Texas Inpatient Public Use Data File (PUDF) provided by the Texas Department of
State Health Services (DSHS). In the reference year, Texas is partitioned into 9 state-
owned mental hospitals (SMH) with the corresponding hospital service areas (HSA)
with a total resident population of 3.83 million. HSA are local health care markets
for hospital care. An HSA is a collection of ZIP codes whose residents receive most of
their hospitalizations from the hospitals in that area. HSAs were defined by assigning
ZIP codes to the hospital area where the greatest proportion of their Medicare resi-
dents were hospitalized. In Figure 1, Texas is divided into 8 HSA, but our data are
disaggregated into 9 SMH, since we also analyze Kerrville State Hospital, which offers
statewide Forensic Services. Table 1 lists the counties served by each SMH.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
(Insert Table 1 here)
We focus our empirical work on the model’s predictions concerning the determinants
of the cross-county variation in choosing a particular SMH. The conditional logit
model as given by Equation (11) for the matrix of patient flows, hrs, from county r to
hospital s may be specified in terms of Poisson sampling (Guimaraes, Figueiredo and
Woodward, 2003):
hrs ∼ Poisson(µrs), r = 1, 2, . . . , 254; s = 1, 2, . . . , 9, (13)
where the Poisson mean is predicted by:
µ̂rs = k ALOSs FSs Drs ADJrs HSArs CFrs, (14)
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with the exposure variable as the population in county r, POPr, which indicates the
number of times the event could have happened. The dependent variable, hrs, is
the number of patients admitted to hospital that flow from each county of origin, r,
to each possible SMH of destination, s; k is an overall constant; ALOSs represents
average length of stay in hospital s; FSs is a dummy variable that indicates if the
SMH provides forensic services; Drs represents road distance between r and s; ADJrs
is a dummy variable that indicates if county r has a border with the county where
SMH is located; HSArs is a dummy variable that indicates if county r belongs to the
SMH’s HSA; and CFrs is the competition factor or an index that yields the gravity
faced by SMH s in attracting patients from r.
The benchmark model, given by equation (14), will be used primarily to test the
validity of the gravity model as a relevant empirical framework for patient flows. Equa-
tion (14) provides a suitable testing ground for the competing gravity model because
it groups the variables in (14) so as to match the terms of equation (11). In fact,
POPr, the exposure variable used in Equation (14), proxies Nr in equation (11). We
can think of road distance, adjacency, and HSA in (14) to account for the economic
distance between the county and the SMH. The variables proxying for SMH services’
quality are ALOS and provision of forensic services. The remaining variable in equa-
tion (14), the competition factor, accounts for the competition exerted by alternative
destinations. We will replace the CFrs in equation (14) with the accessibility measure
variable, AMs, to fully test the competition-agglomeration hypothesis.
Further below, instead of using population as the exposure variable, we will add
counties’ population and income per capita to equation (14) as factors determining the
push factors of the residential areas. We will also add HSA’s population and average
income per capita as factors determining the pull factors of the SMH. Population
indicates the market demographic size of the county. This variable enters the model
as a push factor when referred to the counties of origin, POPr, and a pull factor
when referred to the HSA, POPHSA. We consider estimated population by county
for the year 2006, provided by DSHS Center for Health Statistics. If we assume that
the hospital utilization rate does not vary with the market demographic size, then
population proxies the internal demand for hospital admissions arising at a given SMH.
We expect that the larger this demand the greater the possibility of reaching scale
economies in hospital production and that risk sharing among the patients should lead
to economies of scale in insurance cost. This implication has found empirical support
in the analysis of Wholey, Feldman, Christianson and Engberg (1996). Because of
such scale effects, patients enrolled in larger HSAs are, other things being equal, more
likely to receive high quality specialized mental hospital care. Therefore, our case
study is particularly well suited to conducting an empirical test for the presence of
scale effect due to the size of population. If there are scale effects, we expect that
the larger the HSA population the larger the inflow of patients. If we reject the scale
effects, we expect a negative effect due to the problem of shortage of state hospital
beds in larger HSAs (Torrey, Kennardm, Eslinger, Lamb and Pavle, 2010).
Income per capita enters the model as a push factor when referred to the counties
of origin, Yr, and a pull factor when referred to the HSA, YHSA. The variable income
per capita is measured as the after-tax income per capita available on average to indi-
viduals living in a given county. It is estimated using data from U.S. Census Bureau.
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In the literature on hospital choice, income is shown to positively affect mobility, i.e.
richer individuals are able to choose destinations further away. In our aggregate spatial
interaction modeling, average income per capita is likely to capture broadly defined
socio-economic factors operating at each county and HSA. Since people in low income
or poverty levels are associated with several lifetime mental disorders (Bassuk, Buck-
ner, Perloff and Bassuk, 1998), we expect to observe a negative relationship between
counties’ income per capita and patient flows to SMH. Conversely, we expect to ob-
serve, ceteris paribus, better quality of care in richer HSAs and therefore an emergent
pattern of patient flows moving to richer HSAs.
We are interested in analyzing the effects on patient flows of some SMH specific
variables. The regressors included in our specification are proxies capturing the broad
concept of quality in the supply of hospital care. These variables enter the model as
pull factors (i.e. referred to the SMH of destination). We included the average length
of stay in hospitals, ALOSs, that is often used as an indicator of quality of care and
efficiency in hospitals (Thomas, Guire and Horvat, 1997, Borghans, Kleefstra, Kool
and Westert, 2012). All other things being equal, a shorter stay will have a positive
effect on flows of patients. The source of this variable is the DSHS Center for Health
Statistics Utilization Review: Specific Inpatient Procedures by Texas Hospital Referral
Region Reports on Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) (Guide to Texas HMO
Quality: 2006).
We also analyzed the provision of forensic services, FSs, of Texas’ SMH. According
to DSHS, the forensic population in SMHs is increasing. The role of the SMH in
the treatment of forensic patients has expanded in recent years as some SMHs have
experienced a significant increase in the number of forensic patients they serve. A
forensic patient is one who is admitted to an SMH by judicial order because he or
she has been determined unfit to stand trial or found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Forensic commitments generally involve longer lengths of stays in the SMHs. All other
things being equal, the provision of forensic services will have a positive effect on flows
of patients.
(Insert Table 2 here)
In the following subsections we discuss the variables used to proxy the separation
factors between counties and SMHs and to characterize the geographical pattern of
patients’ flows. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the regressors included
in the empirical application.
3.1 Separation Factors
The gravity model emphasizes the significance of separation factors in determining
the pattern of the economic interactions flows (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).
Very often in empirical applications the physical distance between economic centers is
used to proxy the separation factors in the gravity model (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro,
2006, Fabbri and Robone, 2010, Congdon, 2001).
The separation factors between each county and SMH have been calculated as the
“road distance” and the “driving time” between the counties’ centers required to travel
from one county to a SMH. The “road distance” and the “driving time” between the
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county’s center and the SMH were constructed from Google Maps. We assume that
patients used the driving directions by car suggested by Google Maps. Google Maps
use speed limits provided by data providers, which generally obtain the information
from road signs or public records. The variables were expressed in kilometers and
minutes, respectively. Other things being equal, road distance, Drs, should capture
the deterrence effect on patient flows due to direct and indirect cost of mobility.
Adjacency, ADJrs, is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 when the county of
origin and destination share a border, and 0 otherwise. This variable is often included
in the gravity models as a flow facilitator. Another measure of separation has been
adopted in our analysis. We considered a dummy variable assuming a value 1 when
the county belongs to the same local health care markets for hospital care, HSArs,
and 0 otherwise. This variable is intended as a control for the presence of institutional
factors that positively affect patient mobility to the corresponding SMH.
3.2 Geographical Patterns
To control for geographical patterns, we use the competition factor as given by Equa-
tion (10), and a potential accessibility measure, as proposed by (Fotheringham, 1983a),
see Equation (12). The competition factor, CFrs, is a composite variable that seeks
to capture the gravity of the competing destinations (de Mello-Sampayo, 2009) and
it is the sum, weighted by economic distance of all other SMHs’ characteristics (ex-
cept SMH s) in attracting patients flows from each county. The potential accessibility
measure, AMs, represents the accessibility of destination s in relation to all other
destinations. This type of access measure may model competition and agglomeration
effects.
To proxy the SMH’s overall quality in attracting patients’flows, we used average
charge per patient relative to SMH’s average price provided by the Texas DSHS.
Decision makers observe and decide the viability, utility, and characteristics of health
care goods and services only after using those products or services. Thus, the quality
of health care good or service can only be ascertained upon their consumption. In
such cases, a drop in price is often interpreted by the prospective consumer as a drop
in quality or utility of the product or service. Indeed, it is possible for the demand
curve for medical care to be upward sloping, even though medical care is a non-inferior
good, a relationship that has some empirical support (Hoi and Robson, 1981, Hau,
2008, Dusansky and Cagatay, 2010). Relative price of health goods or services is thus,
a good indicator of quality in SMH services. Further, relative price is correlated with
the variable used in this study to analyze the quality of the Texas SMH (ALOS) and
so is arguably able to capture the overall characteristics of the SMH. However, in order
to avoid multicollinearity problems, the relative price and “driving time” will be used
only to compute the competition factor and the accessibility measure.
4 Results
The results are presented for two separate cases. In the first case, presented in Table
3, the gravity equation as given by Equations (13) and (14) is estimated with counties’
population as the exposure variable. The case where counties’ population and income
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per capita enter the gravity model as push factors of the residential areas, and HSA’s
population and average income per capita as pull factors of the SMH is then presented
in Table 4.
(Insert table 3 here)
Table 3 is arranged into two main sections. The first is composed of columns (1)–(2),
which correspond to the random effects poisson model estimation, and the other com-
posed of columns (3)–(4), which correspond to the population average poisson model
estimation. As seen in Table 3, for every Poisson model, according to the Wald test
the overall significance of the regressors is not rejected at the 1% significance level.
The random effects specification is also not rejected with a highly significant likeli-
hood ratio (LR) test. Columns (2) and (4) present the results for the estimation of the
gravity equation when the competition factor, CFrs, in columns (1) and (3) is replaced
by the accessibility measure variable, AMs, to test the competition-agglomeration hy-
pothesis. The coefficient estimates all have the correct signs and are significant in
columns (1) and (3) with the exception of adjacency, ADJrs, which is not significant
in column (3). In columns (2) and (4) the coefficient estimates all have the expected
sign. However, the accessibility measure variable, AMs, is not significantly different
from zero in either column, and adjacency, ADJrs, is not significant in column (4).
The results of the population average poisson model (column 3) suggest that,
at sample means, changes in ALOS negatively affect the patient flows to SMH by
0.9, whereas the positive effect of provision of forensic services is approximately 0.8.
Changes in distance negatively affect the patient flow to SMH by 0.6, adjacency posi-
tively affects by 0.2, and the HSA positively affects the patient flow by 2.5. Supported
by the model’s predictions, in this econometric application the competition factor,
CFrs, negatively affects the patient flows by 5.3.
Under the hypothesis of competition-agglomeration (columns 2 and 4), the data
predict that at the sample means, the negative effect of variations in ALOS on the
patient flow to SMH is approximately 0.7, whereas the positive effect of provision
of forensic services on the patient flows is approximately 0.3. Changes in distance
negatively affect the patient flow to SMH by 0.5, adjacency positively affects by 0.1,
and the HSA positively affects the patient flow by 2.6. The patient flow to SMH is
negatively affected by variations in the accessibility measure variable, AMs, by 0.02
which suggests that the access measure models competition effects.
It is worth noting that although the qualitative response of patient flows to the
different explanatory variables is similar, the quantitative impact differs under the
two different geographical pattern variables. This discrepancy is explained not only
by differences in the specification of the respective variable, but also by the underly-
ing assumptions of each model. Therefore, the quantitative results obtained for each
specification do not lend themselves to direct comparison. In fact, as opposed to the
accessibility measure under the competition-agglomeration hypothesis, the competi-
tion factor is capturing the gravity of alternative SMHs. What can be drawn from
the similarity of the qualitative results is that the predictions of the analytical model
developed earlier are robust to both specifications.
(Insert Table 4 here)
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Table 4 presents the results when we add to equation (14) counties’ population and
income per capita as push factors of the residential areas, and HSA’s population
and average income per capita as pull factors of the SMH. Table 4 is arranged into
two main sections. The first is composed of columns (1)–(2), which correspond to
the random effects poisson model and the other composed of columns (3)–(4), which
correspond to the population average poisson model. The results of the model with the
competition factor, CFrs, characterizing the spatial pattern, is presented in columns
(1) and (3) and with the accessibility measure variable, AMs, to test the competition-
agglomeration hypothesis, is presented in columns (2) and (4). Under both spatial
patterns’ characterizations we do not reject the overall significance of the regressors
with the Wald test and we do not reject the random effects specification with a highly
significant LR test.
The estimates of the gravity model under both spatial patterns’ characterizations
suggest, as expected, a positive and significant coefficient for counties’ population,
and since in our aggregate spatial interaction modeling, average income per capita is
proxying socio-economic factors operating at each county, a negative and significant
coefficient for the counties’ income per capita is suggestive that low-income individuals
are more likely to be the patients admitted in SMH’s services. With regard to the
variables that make up the push factors in the model, namely HSA’s population and
average income per capita, the results vary with the two spatial patterns’ variables.
Under the population average model estimation, when using the competition factor
to characterize the geographical pattern (column 3), changes in HSA’s population
negatively affects the patients’ flows by 0.5. This result does not give support to the
presence of scale effect due to the size of population. However, the coefficient estimate
for the HSA’s population has the expected sign, but it is not significantly different from
zero when using the accessibility measure to characterize the geographical pattern.
HSA’s income per capita positively affects, as expected, the patients’ flow to SMH
by 0.7. This estimated income effect is lower than under the accessibility measure’s
model, which stands at 1.3. For both spatial patterns’ characterization, there is a
pattern of patient flows to SMH in richer HSA, so as to get better quality of care in
richer HSA.
At the sample means, we observe that when using the competition factor to char-
acterize the geographical pattern (column 3), the patients’ flow to SMH is affected
negatively by the change in ALOS by around 0.5, and positively by the provision of
forensic services by around 0.7. On the other hand, with respect to the spatial fac-
tors, the patient flow is negatively affected by the road distance and the competition
factor and positively by the adjacency and HSA by around 0.7, 4.5, 0.03, and 2.6,
respectively. When using the accessibility measure to characterize the geographical
pattern (column 4), though not significant, ALOS, forensic services, adjacency, and
the accessibility measure have the expected signs.
With respect to the variables that make up the geographical pattern in the model,
namely competition factor and accessibility measure, the coefficient of the competition
factor is significantly higher and different from zero. The estimated negative effect of
the competition factor on patient flows reflects the fact that the higher the quality
and the better localized the concurrent SMH, the fewer inflows one expects to occur to
a particular SMH. The result by which the accessibility measure affects patient flows
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negatively is explained by the fact that the more accessible one SMH is to another
raises the competition between SMH and the fewer inflows of patients we observe.
However, the remarkable feature of the present results is the strong impact of the
competition factor. The relevance of such a result in the present context is that, by
highlighting the importance of the gravity of alternative SMH on patient flows, it
lends overwhelming support to the analytical framework proposed in the first part of
the paper.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents the micro-foundations for the gravity model with the aim of
analyzing the flows of patients from their residential areas to the health service areas
in a context of interdependence of the flows. With the goal of empirically testing the
theoretical model, a discrete-variable econometric model that uses ALOS as the proxy
for (the reciprocal) of the quality of hospital is estimated for a 2006 sample of US
Texas counties’ patient flows into SMHs. To control for the geographical pattern, we
included in the gravity model a composite variable, the competition factor, capturing
the gravity of alternative destinations. We also used an accessibility measure to test
the competition-agglomeration hypothesis of alternative destinations.
The results of the econometric estimation suggest that the theoretical model can
explain the patient flows from Texas’ counties to SMHs under the hypothesis of in-
terdependence of the flows. Indeed, as predicted, patient flows depend negatively on
the ALOS, on road distance and on the gravity and accessibility of alternative SMH.
Patient flows depend positively on the provision of forensic services, on adjacency, and
on the institutional factors. By suggesting that patient flows depend not only on the
push factors, pull factors and spatial factors but crucially on the geographical pattern,
the overall empirical results corroborate the use of the competing-destinations of the
gravity model.
Texas’ patient flows are also found to be increasing in counties’ population and
HSA’s income per capita, and decreasing in HSA’s population and counties’ income
per capita. Thus, our results do not lend support to the presence of scale effects in
SMHs due to the size of population. This result, combined with the negative effect of
ALOS and with the positive effect of the provision of forensic services on patient flows,
highlights the problem of caseload growth. One of the major problems associated with
the growing forensic population is the longer lengths of stay. These longer lengths of
stay and the overall increase in the forensic population has led to longer wait times and
waiting lists at SMHs for forensic beds. Addressing all of these challenges to SMHs
will require critical policy and fiscal decisions. One solution might be to reinforce
the continuum of care or assisted outpatient treatment (Torrey et al., 2010), which
requires selected seriously mentally ill persons to take medication under court order
as a condition for living in the community.
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Figure and Tables to be Included in Main
Text
Figure 1: Texas State Hospital Service Areas
17
Table 1: Counties in State Mental Hospitals Services Areas
Hospitals Service Areas Counties
North Texas State Hospital Archer, Armstrong, Baylor, Brown, Carson, Childress, Clay,
Coleman, Collingsworth, Comanche, Cooke, Cottle, Dallam,
Deaf Smith, Denton, Dickens, Donley, Eastland, Erath,
Foard, Gray, Grayson, Hall, Hansford, Hardeman, Hartley,
Haskell, Hemphill, Hood, Hutchinson, Jack, Johnson,
King, Knox, Lipscomb, Montague, Moore, Ochiltree, Oldham,
Palo Pinto, Parker, Potter, Randall, Roberts, Sherman,
Somervell, Stonewall, Tarrant, Throckmorton, Wheeler, Wichita,
Wilbarger, Wise, and Young.
Terrell State Hospital Camp, Collin, Dallas, Delta, Ellis, Fannin, Franklin,
Henderson, Hopkins, Hunt, Kaufman, Lamar, Morris, Navarro,
Rains, Titus, Van Zandt, and Wood.
Rusk State Hospital Anderson, Angelina, Bowie, Cass, Chambers, Cherokee, Gregg,
Hardin, Harris, Harrison, Houston, Jasper, Jefferson,
Liberty, Marion, Montgomery, Nacogdoches, Newton, Orange,
Panola, Polk, Red River, Rusk, Sabine, San Augustine, San Jacinto,
Shelby, Smith, Trinity, Tyler, Upshur, and Walker.
Austin State Hospital Austin, Bastrop, Bell, Blanco, Bosque, Brazoria, Brazos,
Burleson, Burnet, Caldwell, Colorado, Coryell, Falls,
Fayette, Fort Bend, Freestone, Galveston, Grimes, Hamilton,
Hays, Hill, Lampasas, Lee, Leon, Limestone, Madison, Matagorda,
McCulloch, McLennan, Milam, Mills, Robertson, San Saba, Travis,
Waller, Washington, Wharton, and Williamson.
San Antonio State Hospital Aransas, Atascosa, Bandera, Bee, Bexar, Calhoun, Comal, Dewitt,
Dimmit, Edwards, Frio, Gillespie, Goliad, Gonzales, Guadalupe,
Jackson, Jim Hogg, Karnes, Kendall, Kerr, Kinney, La Salle,
Llano, Lavaca, Live Oak, Mason, Maverick, Medina, Menard, Nueces,
Real, Refugio, San Patricio, Schleicher, Starr, Sutton, Uvalde,
Val Verde, Victoria, Webb, Wilson, Zapata, and Zavala.
Kerrville State Hospital Statewide Forensic Services.
Big Spring State Hospital Andrews, Bailey, Borden, Brewster, Briscoe, Callahan, Castro, Cochran,
Coke, Concho, Crane, Crockett, Crosby, Culberson, Dawson,
Ector, El Paso, Fisher, Floyd, Gaines, Garza, Glasscock, Hale,
Hockley, Howard, Hudspeth, Irion, Jeff Davis, Jones, Kent,
Lamb, Loving, Lubbock, Lynn, Martin, Midland,Mitchell, Motley,
Nolan, Parmer, Pecos, Presidio, Reagan, Reeves, Runnels, Scurry,
Shackleford, Stephens, Sterling, Swisher, Taylor, Terrell,
Terry, Tom Green, Upton, Ward, Winkler, and Yoakum.
Rio Grande State Center Brooks, Cameron, Duval, Hidalgo, Jim Wells, Kenedy, Kleberg,
Willacy.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variable
Patient Flow 7.23 61.44 0 1843
Push Factors
Population County 92 550.33 329 826.10 60 3 830 130
Income per capita County 21 521.11 5 049.17 10 180 42 220
Pull Factors
ALOS 132.22 230.07 18 777
Forensic Services 0.67 0.47 0 1
Spatial Factors
Road Distance 542.69 286.84 2 1757
Adjacency 0.02 0.14 0 1
HSA 0.22 0.42 0 1
Competition Factor 159.77 14.27 133.85 176.85
Accessibility Measure 0.45 0.11 0.26 0.60
Variables in Logs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Push Factors
Log Population County 9.85 1.64 4.09 15.16
Log Income per capita County 9.95 0.23 9.23 10.65
Pull Factors
Log Population HSA 14.68 0.69 13.52 15.62
Log Income per capita HSA 9.85 0.26 9.22 10.14
Log ALOS 3.76 0.60 2.89 4.73
Spatial Factors
Log Road Distance 6.14 0.68 0.69 7.47
Log Competition Factor 5.06 0.09 4.90 5.18
Log Accessibility Measure -0.87 0.29 -1.34 -0.51
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Table 3: Model Estimates
Random Effects Population Average
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pull Factors
Log ALOS (ALOSs) -0.800*** -0.825*** -0.892*** -0.721***
(0.057) (0.284) (0.094) (0.239)
Forensic Services (FSs) 0.733*** 0.827* 0.751*** 0,311
(0.126) (0.519) (0.140) (0.277)
Spatial Factors
Log Road Distance (Drs) -0.587*** -0,587*** -0,560*** -0.517***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.126) (0.114)
Adjacency (ADJrs) 0.285*** 0.287*** 0.175 0.084
(0.024) (0.024) (0.195) (0.236)
HSA (HSArs) 2.321*** 2.320*** 2.510*** 2.631***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.358) (0.344)
Log Competition Factor (CFrs) -5.277*** — -5.301*** —
(0.520) (0.759)
Log Accessibility Measure (AMs) — -0,096 — -0.022
(0.778) (0.416)
Constant 21.914*** -4,591*** 22.041*** -5.459***
(2.642) (1.331) (4.147) (1.113)
Alfa 0.020 0.257 — —
(0.010) (0.117)
No. Observations 2286 2286 2286 2286
No. SMH 9 9 9 9
Wald Test 34438.50*** 34061.50*** 2140.37*** 2222.60***
Degrees of Freedom 6 6 6 6
Likelihood-ratio Test 233.39*** 2900.07*** — —
Degrees of Freedom 1 1
Exposure Variable: County’s Population.
Standard errors in parentheses. Robust Standard errors in parentheses in columns (3) and (4).
* Rejects the null at the 10% level. ** Rejects the null at the 5% level. *** Rejects the null at the 1% level.
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Table 4: Model Estimates with Push Factors
Random Effects Population Average
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Push Factors
Log Population County (POPs) 0.816*** 0.816*** 0.850*** 0.839***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.060) (0.072)
Log Income per capita County (Ys) -1.425*** -1,424*** -1.407*** -1.162**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.502) (0.533)
Pull Factors
Log Population HSA (POPHSA) -0.106 0.003 -0.455*** 0.104
(0.183) (0.649) (0.166) (1.055)
Log Income per capita HSA (YHSA) 0.385 1.420* 0.699 1.286**
(0.326) (0.781) (0.461) (0.572)
Log ALOS (ALOSs) -0.787*** -0.928 -0.453*** -0.798
(0.204) (0.625) (0.129) (0.764)
Forensic Services (FSs) 1.166*** 1.129 0.671** 0,709
(0.270) (0.750) (0.298) (0.759)
Spatial Factors
Log Road Distance (Drs) -0.651*** -0,650*** -0.654*** -0.591***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.100) (0.065)
Adjacency (ADJrs) 0.054** 0.053** 0.032 0.051
(0.024) (0.024) (0.238) (0.294)
HSA (HSArs) 2.387*** 2.388*** 2.550*** 2.634***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.361) (0.382)
Log Competition Factor (CFrs) -5.244*** — -4.451*** —
(0.811) (0.859)
Log Accessibility Measure (AMs) — -0,040 — -0.625
(1.018) (1.414)
Constant 28.610*** -9,158 24.843*** -13.657
(6.478) (10.423) (6.820) (14.419)
Alfa 0.036 0.203 — —
(0.017) (0.093)
No. Observations 2286 2286 2286 2286
No. SMH 9 9 9 9
Wald Test 63319.92*** 63060.30*** 2130.81*** 300.65***
Degrees of Freedom 10 10 7 7
Likelihood-ratio Test 401.47*** 2229.29*** — —
Degrees of Freedom 1 1
Standard errors in parentheses. Robust Standard errors in parentheses in columns (3) and (4).
* Rejects the null at the 10% level. ** Rejects the null at the 5% level. *** Rejects the null at the 1% level.
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